Introduction
The language of extensive games is complex and rich. It allows one to express such notions as the order of moves, the information a player has when it is her turn to move, etc. It is not, however, a sufficiently rich language in the sense that there are meaningful and natural statements that one can make (about a given extensive game) whose truth cannot be decided without making the language richer. We shall give two examples. Consider first the extensive form of Figure 1 . 
Restricting attention to the class of extensive games defined by von Neumann and Morgenstern with the added assumption of perfect recall, we specify the information of each player at each node of the game-tree in a way which is coherent with the original information structure of the extensive form. We show that this approach provides a framework for a formal and rigorous treatment of questions of knowledge and common knowledge at every node of the tree. We construct a particular information partition for each player and show that it captures the notion of maximum information in the sense that it is the finest within the class of information partitions that satisfy four natural properties. Using this notion of "maximum information

FIGURE 1
Consider the following statement: « If node t 2 is reached, then every player knows that player 1 chose action a, but it is not common knowledge among the players that player 1 chose a ».
Is this statement true for the extensive game of Figure 1 ? If one adopts the standard semantics for knowledge and common knowledge 1 then, in order to answer this question, one needs the following:
1. a set of "states" (or "possible worlds"), Ω, is reached" and "player 1 chose a" as events, that is, as subsets of Ω, call them τ and A, respectively, 3. for every player i, a partition . i of Ω (i's information partition).
Once we have these three elements, deciding whether or not the above sentence is true becomes a simple matter of computation. In order for it to be true we need that: ii. τ ¼ CKA (where CKA is the event that A is common knowledge).
We can, trivially, construct a model where the above sentence is true and one where it is not: VERIFYING model REFUTING model Ω = α, β, γ , "node t 2 is reached" = τ = {α},
"player 1 chose a" = A = α, β , . 1 = . 2 = {α}, {β,γ}, . 3 = {α,β}, {γ}.
Meet of . i 's = {α,β,γ}.
Thus K 1 A = K 2 A = {α}, K 3 A = {α,β}, CKA = ∅ Ω = { α}, "node t 2 is reached" = τ = {α} "player 1 chose a" = A = ∅ This is not, however, a satisfactory answer to the above question. Both of these models are artificial, in the sense that there is nothing in them that tells us that we are talking about the extensive form of Figure 1 . There is no connection between the extensive form and the proposed model. On the other hand, it is quite natural to consider a model where Ω is the set of nodes of the game tree (Ω = {t 1 , t 2 , ..., t 23 } = T) and those two sentences have the following interpretation:
SENTENCE INTERPRETING EVENT
" node t 2 is reached " τ = t 2
" player 1 chose a " A = t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 , t 8 , t 9 , t 10 , However, in order to analyze epistemic statements one would also need, for every player, a partition of the set of nodes T. The definition of extensive game does not provide us with such partitions: for every player, we are only given her information at her decision nodes and not at any other node.
As a further example of the fact that the language of extensive games is not sufficiently rich, consider the following statement:
« If a node of a subgame is reached, then every player knows (or the stronger claim "it is common knowledge") that the subgame has been reached ».
Is this statement true in an arbitrary extensive game? Is it necessarily true? Again, it seems that a natural model in which to analyze such statement would be one where the set of states is the set of nodes. Once again we are lead to the issue of how to obtain, for every player, a partition of the set of nodes.
We provide a simple solution to this problem. We consider the class of extensive games defined by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) with the added assumption of perfect recall. Following Bonanno (1992a) we specify the information of each player at each node of the game-tree in a way which is coherent with the original information structure of the extensive form. Then the multi-stage structure of this class of games allows a characterization of the notions of knowledge and common knowledge for each stage of the game. However, the specification of this extended information structure is partially arbitrary. Therefore we consider a class of extended information structures that satisfy four natural properties and in Proposition 1 we provide a constructive characterization of the finest one (that is, the one which gives maximum information). It turns out that the same kind of construction also provides an alternative characterization of the meet of these finest information partitions (and, therefore, of the notion of common knowledge with maximum information: Proposition 4). We also show that it is not necessarily true that at a node of a subgame it is common knowledge among the players that the subgame has been reached, although it is true for the case of maximum information. On the other hand, it is necessarily true (that is, for all extended information structures) that in a simultaneous game at every decision node there are no non-trivial events which are common knowledge among the players.
What can one expect to gain by extending the notion of information structure in extensive games? We suggest several answers.
1. Using extended information structures it is possible to trace the evolution of a player's beliefs along every possible play of the game. One can then impose (internal and mutual) consistency properties on belief revision and use these properties to define new equilibrium concepts (see Bonanno, 1992b) or provide alternative characterizations of known solution concepts (see Bonanno, 1995) .
2. In many cases it may be reasonable to assume that the extensive game is not an exhaustive description of the strategic situation. For example, unmodelled phases of communication and/or bargaining may occur. This is the rationale for the definition of coalition-proof and renegotiation-proof equilibria 2 . Under this interpretation a synchronic description of players' information is essential and constitutes a pre-requisite for any extension of the above-mentioned solution concepts to situations of dynamic strategic interaction with differential information. For example, one might impose the restriction that a coalition of players can contemplate, at node t, a joint deviation from a given equilibrium only if it is common knowledge among those players, at node t, that the joint deviation will benefit them all. Such an approach would clearly require extended information structures, without which the notion of an event being common knowledge at an arbitrary node is not well-defined.
3. The literature on conjectural or self-confirming equilibria [ Battigalli and Guaitoli (1996) , Fudenberg and Levine (1993) , Kalai and Lehrer (1993a,b) , Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1994) ] interprets the given extensive game as a constituent of a larger repeated game (with, possibly, imperfect monitoring) and tries to define and characterize outcomes that can be "stable" under plausible learning processes. In this literature information partitions on the set of terminal nodes of the game are taken as primitive and issues of (common) knowledge are relevant. The approach put forward in this paper extends to the entire game − and provides a rationale for − the information partitions on the set of end nodes of the constituent game.
4. The notion of extended information structure can considerably simplify the representation of games. Suppose, for instance, that we want to describe a parlor game as an extensive game where at the beginning a die is thrown, every player observes the result and then, say, player 1 has to make the next move. That every player observes the outcome of the throw of the die can be modeled in a standard extensive game by drawing after each of the six moves of Nature a sequence of information sets for each player, where each information set consists of a single node and is followed by a single action. Each of these information sets indicates that the corresponding player gets informed, not that he has to make a decision. After that we model the remaining game, starting with the information sets for player 1. Of course, hardly anybody will do so in practice. One will not draw any information sets followed by single actions and will draw information sets for the opponents of player 1 only after player 1 has moved. But this practice does not properly reflect the fact that the information about the throw of a die and player 1's move do not come together, but in pieces. One might argue that the only information about the play of the game which can be relevant is the one that a player has when he has to make a "real" choice. And this information is described by the information sets followed by at least two actions. However, there is at least one interesting solution concept which is not invariant under the addition or deletion of information sets followed by single actions. This is the notion of perfect sequential equilibrium due to Grossman and Perry (1986;  on this point see Noeldeke and van Damme, 1990) . Instead of drawing information sets followed by single actions we can use the extended partitions. Then it suffices to draw, in our example, one decision node (the root) for the random move followed by six decision nodes of player 1 which are followed by his actions and corresponding decision nodes. Then the description of the remaining game follows. That, for instance, everybody is informed about the outcome of the random move is described by having the six decision nodes following the origin as singleton sets in the extended partitions. Besides saving nodes and information sets the extended partitions provide directly, for each decision node, the information each player has about the play of the game until this node is reached. The extended partitions may constitute a step towards a general, alternative way to model games in extensive form, where one is not forced to misrepresent the actual flow and timing of information.
5. Recently, Maskin and Tirole (1994) have analyzed the notion of sequential Markov equilibrium in multistage games with simultaneous choices at every stage. Crucial to their analysis is the notion that at every stage each player has an information partition of the histories up to that point. Our approach clearly generalizes the notion of information partition over the set of histories to a larger class of games and provides a test for checking whether any given postulated partition is consistent with the original information structure of the extensive game (in order to be, it has to be a coarsening of the maximum information extended structure that we define and characterize in Section 4).
6. In a recent paper, Aumann (1995) models explicitly the notion of common knowledge of rationality in extensive games and studies its implications. Aumann's epistemic model refers to the ex ante stage (before the game is played) and is applied only to perfect information games. He suggests (p. 17) that his results would still hold if his epistemic model were to be extended so as to encompass the play of the game, since "when the time comes for a player to move, he certainly knows at least as much as he did when play started". The approach we put forward enables one to extend any epistemic model of a game to include the set of nodes of the game tree 3 . Furthermore, it allows one to remove the restriction to perfect information games (for a an example see Bonanno, 1994) . 7. Finally, as shown above, without extended information structures there are meaningful statements about extensive games whose truth cannot be decided.
Definition of von Neumann-Morgenstern extensive form with perfect recall
For reasons that will be discussed later (Section 6), throughout this paper we restrict attention to the class of extensive forms 4 (with or without chance moves) defined by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) with the added assumption of perfect recall. We shall call them "vN-M extensive forms".
DEFINITION. An extensive form is a vN-M extensive form if, whenever two nodes belong to the same information set, the number of predecessors of one is equal to the number of predecessors of the other. Formally: ∀ t,t′∈T, H(t′) = H(t) ⇒ e(t′) = e(t) (where T is the set of nodes of the game tree and, for every t∈T, H(t) is the information set that contains t and e(t) is the number of predecessors of t) 5 .
REMARK 1. Every extensive form with perfect information is a vN-M extensive form. REMARK 2. Given an extensive form which is not a vN-M extensive form, it may be possible to transform it into one by means of an "inessential transformation". Consider, for example, the extensive form of Figure 2a . It is not a vN-M extensive form because e(t 2 ) = 1 and e(t 3 ) = 2 and t 2 and t 3 belong to the same information set (of player 2). However, it can be transformed into one by adding a "dummy" node and assigning to it a "dummy" player with only one choice, as shown in Figure 2b (the dummy node is t 4 and the dummy player is 3). The interchange of simultaneous moves (see Thompson, 1952, and Bonanno, 1992c ) is another "inessential transformation" that sometimes can be used to transform an extensive form which is not a vN-M extensive form into one which is, as shown in Figure 3 (the extensive form of Figure 3a is not, while that of Figure 3b is, a vN-M extensive form). On the other hand, Figure 4 shows an extensive form which is not a vN-M extensive form and cannot be transformed into one by means of one of the transformations mentioned above. 
FIGURE 4
From now on by "extensive form" we shall always mean a vN-M extensive form with perfect recall.
Information partitions
As explained in the Introduction, our objective is to complete the definition of extensive game by adding, for every player i, a partition of the set T of nodes (player i's information partition). Clearly, the information structure of the game and the assumption of perfect recall impose some constraints.
DEFINITION. Let G be a vN-M extensive form with perfect recall. An information completion of G is an n-tuple . (1) Coherence with the information structure 6 : if node t belongs to information set h of player i, then the cell of .
i that contains t coincides with h. Formally (see the Appendix for a list and explanation of the notation):
(2) Players remember what choices they made: if the immediate predecessor of t belongs to information set h of player i and t comes after choice c at h, then every x∈ [ t ] i comes after choice c. Formally: 
[where Ð denotes the precedence relation].
(4) Players know the stage of the game: for every node t, the cell containing t is a subset of the set of nodes that belong to the same stage as t. Formally:
[recall that e(t) denotes the number of predecessors of t, that is, the stage to which t belongs; T k is the set of stage-k nodes:
By (1), . i represent a generalization of the notion of information set. Properties (2) and (3) are natural restrictions in view of the fact that we only consider extensive forms with perfect recall. Property (4) is a reflection of the multi-stage structure of the game (it is an immediate consequence of the definition of vN-M extensive game that when player i has to move she knows the stage reached by the play; condition (4) extends this property to nodes that are not i's decision nodes).
Given an extensive form G in general there are several possible information completions of it. Consider, for example, the extensive form of Figure 5 . To simplify, restrict attention to the set D of decision nodes (the nodes labeled t 0 to t 6 ). It is easy to see that properties (1)- (4) 
FIGURE 5
If the information transmission rule embodied in . 2 is adopted, then more information is conveyed to player 2 than in the case where the rule expressed by . 2 is followed. In other words, .
2 is a refinement of .
2
(or the latter is a coarsening of the former). We shall show in the next section how to generate the maximum information completion for any given extensive form.
Given an extensive form G and an information completion . 
Thus K i E is the event that player i knows E. Let 0 be the meet (that is, the finest common coarsening) of the partitions . 
Thus CKE is the event that it is common knowledge among all the players that event E has occurred 7 .
The extensive form of Figure 5 gives us an opportunity to answer one question raised in the Introduction, namely whether it is necessarily true that if the play of the game reaches a node that belongs to subgame G′, then every player knows (or the stronger claim "it is common knowledge") that G′ has been reached. The answer is "No". To see this, let G′ be the subgame with root t Γ. Thus at node t 3 not every player knows (a fortiori it is not common knowledge) that G′ has been reached. However, we will see later that in the case of maximum information it is indeed true, in every extensive game, that at a node of a subgame it is common knowledge among the players that the subgame has been reached.
In this section we construct, for every vN-M extensive form with perfect recall, a particular information completion of it and show that it is the finest (that is, the most informative) of the information completions that satisfy Properties (1)-(4).
First some notation. For every node t and for every player i, let + i (t) be the set of information sets of player i that are crossed by paths starting at t (t ¿ y means either t = y or t Ð y):
Next we introduce, for every player i, a relation on T, denoted by i . Let v,w∈T. Then v i w if and only if, either (i) v = w, or (ii) e(v) = e(w) and
The relation i is clearly reflexive and symmetric.
However, in general, it is not transitive. For example, in Figure 6 we have that y 
In Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 below we show that . 1 , ..., . n is an information completion [that is, it satisfies properties (1)- (4)] and that it is the finest of all the information completions that satisfy those properties. . Suppose that H i (t) ≠ h. Then there exist a τ ∈ H i (t) \ h , an x∈h and a g∈ i with g ≠ h, such that both τ and x have a successor in g. Then the successors of x in g come after a choice at h, while the successors of τ in g do not, contradicting the hypothesis of perfect recall.
(2) Players remember what choices they made. Let i be a player, t a node, h an information set of player i and c a choice at h. We have to show that if 5(t)∈h and t∈$(h,c) (recall that 5(t) denotes the immediate predecessor of t and $(h,c) the set of immediate successors of nodes in h following choice c) then H i (t) ⊆ $(h,c). When t is a decision node of player i, this is a trivial consequence of (1) (1)- (4) 
FIGURE 7
From now on, in virtue of Proposition 1, we shall call . 1 , ..., . n the maximum information completion and . i the maximum information partition for player i.
We now highlight some further properties of the maximum information completion.
PROPOSITION 2. Fix a vN-M extensive form with perfect recall G and let . 1 , ..., . n be the maximum information completion of G. Then, for every node t, t is the root of a subGAME if and only if, at every node t such that t ¿ t, it is common knowledge among all the players that the play of the game has reached the subTREE with root t that is, t is the root of a subgame if and only if, for every t such that t ¿ t, [t]
Proof. (Sufficiency). Let t be the root of a subgame. As remarked previously, it is an immediate consequence of the definition of H i ( . ) that, for every i∈N, H i (t) = {t}. Hence if is the meet (the finest common coarsening) of . i i ∈N , then {t}∈ . Furthermore, if t is a successor of t, then, by property (3) (players do not forget), for every player i, every node in H i (t) is a successor of t. Thus [t] contains only successors of t. . Therefore [w]
We showed in the preceding section (cf. Figure 5 ) that Proposition 2 is not true for a general information completion. Proposition 3 below, on the other hand, is true for all information completions.
An extensive form is said to be simultaneous if every play crosses all the information sets (thus, by perfect recall, if there are at least two choices at each information set, it must be the case that every player has exactly one information set). Let . Finally it is worth repeating that for the maximum information partition . i the following is true: if z is a terminal node, then for every player i, H i (z) = {z}. Thus, when the play of the game ends at z, it is common knowledge among all the players that the outcome is z 8 .
Maximum information and common knowledge
In this section we show that if we restrict attention to the maximum information completion . . 1 , ..., . n , then we shall denote the corresponding meets by 0 J and 0 J k , respectively. We want to provide an alternative characterization of 0 J k that is, a characterization which is not in terms of the concept of "common coarsening" of the partitions . i k i∈J . In order to do this we repeat the construction of Section 4 with respect to an arbitrary set of player J ⊆ N (instead of a single player i).
For every node t and for every set of players J⊆N, let + J (t) be the set of information sets of players in J that are crossed by paths starting at t: 
Final remarks and conclusion
Restricting attention to the class of extensive forms defined by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) with the added assumption of perfect recall, we specified the information of each player at each node of the game-tree in a way which is coherent with the original information structure of the extensive form. We showed that this approach provides a framework for a formal and rigorous treatment of questions of knowledge and common knowledge at every node of the tree. We constructed a particular information completion and showed that it captures the notion of maximum information in the sense that it is the finest within the class of information completions that satisfy four natural properties. Using this notion of "maximum information" we were able to provide an alternative characterization of the meet of the information partitions. We also showed that, with maximum information, it is indeed true (as normally argued at an informal level) that at any node in a subgame it is common knowledge among all the players that the play of the game has reached that subgame. However, in general − that is, with less than maximum information − this statement is false (as a matter of fact the weaker statement that "all players know that the subgame has been reached" is false in general). On the other hand it is always true (that is, for arbitrary information completions) that in simultaneous games at every decision node there are no non-trivial events that are common knowledge among all the players.
Throughout the paper attention was restricted to vN-M extensive forms. The reason for this is that in games that do not have this multi-stage structure, it may be problematic to define, for every player, a partition of the set of nodes that satisfies the four natural properties of Section 3. Consider, for example, the extensive form of Figure 9 . Suppose that we want to construct an information partition for player 2. If we want the partition to satisfy property (1) (coherence with the information structure) then it must be that [ . In the former case Property (2) would be violated (players remember their own past choices). In the latter case player 2 also needs to be told whether or not she has to move. If she is told that it is not her turn to move, then she will be able to deduce that node x 
FIGURE 9
Prompted by a referee we conclude by discussing the connection between our notion of extended information structure and the notion of "normal form information set" introduced by Swinkels (1993, 1994) (from now on MSS). Every information set h for any player i in a perfect recall game corresponds to the Cartesian product S i (h) × S −i (h) of the strategy profiles of the reduced normal form inducing a path through h. MSS identify the crucial structural property of such sets and propose to consider any set of strategy profiles of a reduced normal form game satisfying this property as a normal form information set. Of course, in general not all the normal form information sets of a given player correspond to actual information sets of the original extensive form. For example, the whole set of strategy profiles of the reduced normal form is a normal form information set for every player, but only one player moves at the root of the original extensive game. Analogously, we define sets of nodes which represent the information of a given player at any point of an extensive game and need not correspond to his actual information sets. For example, the singleton containing the root of the game is an "extended information set" for every player, although only one moves at the root. The obvious question is then: What is the relationship between extended information sets and normal form information sets? The answer is simple and does not depend on the precise mathematical definition given by MSS: an extended information set for player i always corresponds to a normal form information for i in the reduced normal form of the extensive game. In fact, let t be a node at which player i does not move and consider the extended information set H i (t). Now construct a modified extensive game in which an additional stage is added, just before the stage e(t) containing t. The nodes in this stage are just a copy of those in e(t), but formally are decision nodes of player i. However, player i has a unique action at every such node leading to the corresponding node in stage e(t) and his information sets are a copy of i's extended information sets in stage e(t). It is obvious from this construction that the modified game must have the same reduced normal form as the original one and that the strategy profiles inducing a path through H i (t) are precisely those which induce a path through the information set of the modified game containing the copy of node t. Since this is a proper information set (although a trivial one), the corresponding set of strategy profiles must be a normal form information set. (However, since player i does not move at t, the normal form information set corresponding to H i (t) is not "strict" in the sense of MSS, 1994, Definition 8.) On the other hand, it is easy to produce examples of normal form information sets which do not correspond to any extended information sets of the original extensive form game (see, for example, Figures 1 and 2 in MSS, 1994).
the expression "information set" to refer to these objects. On the other hand, the elements of . . 8 This is the information at terminal nodes which is assumed in Fudenberg and Levine's (1993) notion of self-confirming equilibrium. In order to define more general notions of conjectural equilibria, it may be interesting to consider coarser information about terminal nodes. In particular, the one obtained by the coarsest information function, taking into account actual payoff information (see Battigalli, 1987) . Furthermore, our analysis can easily be modified in order to take into account given information partitions on the set of terminal nodes (of course, the corresponding maximum information completion would not necessarily satisfy the property about subgames stated in Proposition 2).
